蒋寒迪, 陈贵娣, 陈晓. 基于监督博弈的证券监管成本效益分析[J]. 南昌航空大学学报(社会科学版), 2003, 5(4): 69-73.
引用本文: 蒋寒迪, 陈贵娣, 陈晓. 基于监督博弈的证券监管成本效益分析[J]. 南昌航空大学学报(社会科学版), 2003, 5(4): 69-73.
JIANG Han-di, CHEN Gui-di, CHEN Xiao. An analysis of securities supervision costs and benefits[J]. JOURNAL OF NANCHANG HANGKONG UNIVERSITY(SOCLAL SCIENCES), 2003, 5(4): 69-73.
Citation: JIANG Han-di, CHEN Gui-di, CHEN Xiao. An analysis of securities supervision costs and benefits[J]. JOURNAL OF NANCHANG HANGKONG UNIVERSITY(SOCLAL SCIENCES), 2003, 5(4): 69-73.

基于监督博弈的证券监管成本效益分析

An analysis of securities supervision costs and benefits

  • 摘要: 寻租行为直接导致了证券监管的失灵,本文运用博弈论中"监督博弈"命题,来探讨监管者自身行为的成本和效益.并以亿安科技为案例对命题进行了实证研究.

     

    Abstract: Rent-seeking directly caused the malfunction of securities supervision. This paper applies the supervision on game from game theory to make research and discussion on the costs and benefits of supervisor himself. Meanwhile, the paper takes "Yian Tech" case as an example to analyze and demonstrate this issue.

     

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