余鑫, 郭小群, 周建设. 国企“内部人控制”浅析[J]. 南昌航空大学学报(社会科学版), 2004, 6(1): 68-72.
引用本文: 余鑫, 郭小群, 周建设. 国企“内部人控制”浅析[J]. 南昌航空大学学报(社会科学版), 2004, 6(1): 68-72.
YU Xin, GUO Xiao-qun, ZHOU Jian-she. An analysis of insiders control in the state-owned enterprises[J]. JOURNAL OF NANCHANG HANGKONG UNIVERSITY(SOCLAL SCIENCES), 2004, 6(1): 68-72.
Citation: YU Xin, GUO Xiao-qun, ZHOU Jian-she. An analysis of insiders control in the state-owned enterprises[J]. JOURNAL OF NANCHANG HANGKONG UNIVERSITY(SOCLAL SCIENCES), 2004, 6(1): 68-72.

国企“内部人控制”浅析

An analysis of insiders control in the state-owned enterprises

  • 摘要: "内部人控制"是国企公司制改革中所普遍面临的一个难题.其主原因有所有者缺位、信息不对称、制衡机制弱化等.针对该问题,我们可以从企业内外构建合理的激励和约束机制,以期将"内部人控制"对所有者造成的损害降低到最小程度.

     

    Abstract: The insiders control is one of the main problems for the state-owned enterprises in the reformation.The main reasons include the vacancy of ow ners,the asy mmetric information and the weakening of balance mechanism.To resolve the problem,we can construct a perfect mechanism of entrepreneurs.incentive and binding mechanism so as to minimize the damages of the insiders control to the owners of corporations.

     

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