王越子. 资本形态裂变与企业权力博弈——一个关于企业所有权安排的分析框架[J]. 南昌航空大学学报(社会科学版), 2006, 8(2): 12-15,38.
引用本文: 王越子. 资本形态裂变与企业权力博弈——一个关于企业所有权安排的分析框架[J]. 南昌航空大学学报(社会科学版), 2006, 8(2): 12-15,38.
Wang Yue-zi. Disintegration of the capital shape and enterprise power game——An analysis frame concerning enterprise ownership arrangement[J]. JOURNAL OF NANCHANG HANGKONG UNIVERSITY(SOCLAL SCIENCES), 2006, 8(2): 12-15,38.
Citation: Wang Yue-zi. Disintegration of the capital shape and enterprise power game——An analysis frame concerning enterprise ownership arrangement[J]. JOURNAL OF NANCHANG HANGKONG UNIVERSITY(SOCLAL SCIENCES), 2006, 8(2): 12-15,38.

资本形态裂变与企业权力博弈——一个关于企业所有权安排的分析框架

Disintegration of the capital shape and enterprise power game——An analysis frame concerning enterprise ownership arrangement

  • 摘要: 先验地假设物质资本强权从根本上回避了企业权力来源问题.本文则结合属于"资本形式"范畴的资本形态的裂变来考察企业权力来源呈现出多元化、多层次的复杂结构特征,即资本形态的裂变引起企业权力的泛化.不同的权力主体会根据自身拥有的资本的性质、权重以及谈判力,对契约内容进行边际调整,从而改变初始契约安排,而权力的动态博弈最终决定了企业所有权安排.

     

    Abstract: It is a priori assumed that the material capital power fundamentally evades the question concerning the source of enterprise power.Based on the disintegration of the capital shape belonging to "capital form" category, this paper investigates the pluralistic, multi-level complicated structure characteristics, that is, the fission of the capital shape causes weakening of the enterprise power.Different power subjects, according to the nature of their own capital, weight and negotiation power, give marginal adjustment to the contents of the contract, thus changing the initial contract arrangement.However, the dynamic game of power finally decides the arrangement of enterprise power.

     

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