邱国斌, 谢奉军. 政府补贴背景下企业竞争博弈研究[J]. 南昌航空大学学报(社会科学版), 2014, 16(1): 46-52. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1009-1912.2014.01.009
引用本文: 邱国斌, 谢奉军. 政府补贴背景下企业竞争博弈研究[J]. 南昌航空大学学报(社会科学版), 2014, 16(1): 46-52. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1009-1912.2014.01.009
QIU Guo-bin, XIE Feng-jun. Research on Competition and Game of Enterprises under Government's Subsidy Policy[J]. JOURNAL OF NANCHANG HANGKONG UNIVERSITY(SOCLAL SCIENCES), 2014, 16(1): 46-52. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1009-1912.2014.01.009
Citation: QIU Guo-bin, XIE Feng-jun. Research on Competition and Game of Enterprises under Government's Subsidy Policy[J]. JOURNAL OF NANCHANG HANGKONG UNIVERSITY(SOCLAL SCIENCES), 2014, 16(1): 46-52. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1009-1912.2014.01.009

政府补贴背景下企业竞争博弈研究

Research on Competition and Game of Enterprises under Government's Subsidy Policy

  • 摘要: 为了扩大市场需求,政府对产品实行补贴措施。基于此背景,考虑了两个企业之间的博弈和竞争关系,研究了竞争和补贴对需求、企业定价和企业利润产生的影响。结果表明:政府增加补贴,扩大了产品的需求;但是,企业可能会上调产品价格,部分政府补贴间接地转移给了企业,同时也会促使企业利润增长。应特别强调的是,企业之间的竞争越激烈,那么,随着政府补贴的增大,产品价格、需求、企业利润的增长幅度也会增大。

     

    Abstract: For stimulating consumption demand, product subsidy policy was implemented by the government.Under this background, considering game and competition of two enterprises, we studied the influence on demand, product price and enterprises' profit by competition and subsidy. The result showed that the government increased subsidy, market demand of product would be increased; but the enterprise might raise product price, part of government's subsidy was indirectly transferred to enterprise; meanwhile, enterprises' profit might be also improved.It was especially emphasized that if enterprises' mutual competition was more vigorous, the increased scope of product price, market demand, enterprises' profit might be increased more rapidly with government's subsidy increasing.

     

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