The rule of reference of description

This paper probes into the nature of description from a referring point of view in order to investigate systematically deep into human description and resolve some important theoretical problems related. It finds out that there is an important rule we must observe when we describe: the referring rule; and reaches the conclusion that description has a very important nature, i.e. other-reference. The nature of other-reference is that description cannot contain itself; it's such kind of activity, which cannot take itself as an object. The nature of standard determinates that descriptions must follow the specific rule: the rule of reference. The rules of reference stipulate that a description can't be self-reference, that it can not refer to the description itself, that the reference of a description can be neither the activity of the description itself nor the result of the activity, that a description can be self-reference, but its meaning is the one only when the description itself is ruled out of its reference. The violation of the rule will lead to illegal description. Many misunderstandings in human cognitive history are all related with the wrongful descriptions, and the paradoxes just result from the violation of the rules of description. Self-reference of description is the necessary logical condition that forms paradoxes.