Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Green Supply Chain Integrity Strategy Based on Stackelberg Game

Accelerating the green transformation of enterprises is of great significance to China’s realization of the dual-carbon goal. In order to solve the issues of illegal emissions, false advertising, and weak oversight that have emerged in the development of the green supply chain, Stackelberg games, evolutionary games, and system dynamics models are used to explores the decision-making evolution of the participating entities in the green supply chain and the strategies for system stability, as well as the impact of various factors on the evolution of the green supply chain system. The research reveals that the impact of price sensitivity and green marketing sensitivity on the evolution of entity decisions depends on their ratio; manufacturers’ honest decision-making choices are related to their degree of illegal emissions, with lower levels of illegal emissions tending towards honest behavior; both high supervision costs and high material rewards can reduce the enthusiasm of government oversight; dynamic punishment measures can effectively suppress system volatility and maintain reasonable levels of manufacturer honesty and government oversight probabilities.